Posted By: F4UDash4
Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway - 03/24/24 06:42 PM
Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway
I have only started reading this book earlier in the week. I've already learned quite a bit. I'm going to use this thread as sort of a "note taking" exercise for myself and anyone who is interested.
There was considerable discussion in the Japanese upper ranks on what to do next in early 1942. The Imperial Army wanted to concentrate on China, they opposed expanding the Pacific perimeter to the east as doing so would require many more troops to fortify any newly captured territory. The Imperial Navy was bent on drawing out and fighting a "decisive battle" with the US Navy, achieving a great victory that would (they believed) force the US to negotiate an end to hostilities.
There was much behind the scenes fighting over these opposing views. Yamamoto threatened resignation a couple of times to get his way. The Doolittle Raid also did much to help Yamamoto get his plans, drawing out the US Navy at Midway for the decisive battle, approved. So much so that there was actually plans, after the inevitable (to the Japanese) victory at Midway, to invade and occupy Hawaii in September 1942 and then Northern Australia later in the year. How this could happen with the bulk of the Imperial Army remaining in China, and opposite Russian in Manchuria, isn't explained.
The Japanese carrier force at Midway was planned to have at least 5 Fleet carriers instead of only the 4 that did participate. Zuikaku was to have been part of the Mobile Fleet but her air group was severely depleted at Coral Sea. Shōkaku was damaged at Coral Sea and needed about 2 months worth of repairs. Yamamoto astonishingly never considered consolidating the pilots and aircraft of these 2 carriers air groups and putting them aboard Zuikaku for Midway.... the IJN kept air groups and carriers together as a unit.
Also, the 4 IJN carriers that did join the Midway operation had only 85% of their full complement of aircraft. They did carry about 20 extra Zeroes, and their pilots, that were to be flown ashore to the Midway once the island was captured. But those pilots were not all fully carrier qualified and wouldn't take part in the initial battle. The IJN was already suffering aircraft shortages as production of both the Kate torpedo/horizontal bomber and the Val dive bomber had ENDED. New models to replace them were in the works but not ready, the production lines for the Kate and Val had to be reopened. IJN cruisers, whose float planes were used for scouting, also did not have their full compliment of aircraft.
The 3 US carriers that would meet the 4 Japanese carriers would actually have a slight numerical advantage in aircraft, not even counting the US aircraft stationed on Midway.
I have only started reading this book earlier in the week. I've already learned quite a bit. I'm going to use this thread as sort of a "note taking" exercise for myself and anyone who is interested.
There was considerable discussion in the Japanese upper ranks on what to do next in early 1942. The Imperial Army wanted to concentrate on China, they opposed expanding the Pacific perimeter to the east as doing so would require many more troops to fortify any newly captured territory. The Imperial Navy was bent on drawing out and fighting a "decisive battle" with the US Navy, achieving a great victory that would (they believed) force the US to negotiate an end to hostilities.
There was much behind the scenes fighting over these opposing views. Yamamoto threatened resignation a couple of times to get his way. The Doolittle Raid also did much to help Yamamoto get his plans, drawing out the US Navy at Midway for the decisive battle, approved. So much so that there was actually plans, after the inevitable (to the Japanese) victory at Midway, to invade and occupy Hawaii in September 1942 and then Northern Australia later in the year. How this could happen with the bulk of the Imperial Army remaining in China, and opposite Russian in Manchuria, isn't explained.
The Japanese carrier force at Midway was planned to have at least 5 Fleet carriers instead of only the 4 that did participate. Zuikaku was to have been part of the Mobile Fleet but her air group was severely depleted at Coral Sea. Shōkaku was damaged at Coral Sea and needed about 2 months worth of repairs. Yamamoto astonishingly never considered consolidating the pilots and aircraft of these 2 carriers air groups and putting them aboard Zuikaku for Midway.... the IJN kept air groups and carriers together as a unit.
Also, the 4 IJN carriers that did join the Midway operation had only 85% of their full complement of aircraft. They did carry about 20 extra Zeroes, and their pilots, that were to be flown ashore to the Midway once the island was captured. But those pilots were not all fully carrier qualified and wouldn't take part in the initial battle. The IJN was already suffering aircraft shortages as production of both the Kate torpedo/horizontal bomber and the Val dive bomber had ENDED. New models to replace them were in the works but not ready, the production lines for the Kate and Val had to be reopened. IJN cruisers, whose float planes were used for scouting, also did not have their full compliment of aircraft.
The 3 US carriers that would meet the 4 Japanese carriers would actually have a slight numerical advantage in aircraft, not even counting the US aircraft stationed on Midway.